ISC2 AI Security Pilot Exam · Free study guide

Domain 3 Study Notes: AI Data Management, Privacy, and Model Security

How to use these notes

Domain 3 is about the two things an AI system can't work without: its data and its model. Half the domain covers data governance and privacy, and the other half covers protecting the model itself as a valuable, attackable asset. You don't need a security or privacy background; every term is defined where it first appears. I've followed the ISC2 outline section by section, and each section ends with how I expect it to show up on the exam.

One idea ties the domain together: a model is only as trustworthy as the data that shaped it. Poisoned, mislabeled or unlawfully collected data produces a model with the same problems baked in, and no amount of security around the finished model removes them. That's why so many questions here point back to provenance, integrity checks and controls early in the pipeline.

Everything here is my own work, built from public frameworks and guidance, especially the joint CISA, NSA and FBI guidance on AI data security from May 2025. If a reference book frames something differently, trust the book.

3.1 AI data governance, lineage and accountability

Data ownership roles

Every dataset that feeds an AI system needs named people behind it. These roles come up constantly:

Role What they do
Information owner (data owner) A senior person accountable for the dataset. Decides its classification, who can access it and how it may be used, including whether it may train a model
Data steward Manages quality, definitions, metadata and policy compliance day to day on the owner's behalf
Data custodian The IT or security team that runs the technical controls: storage, backups, encryption and access
Data controller A GDPR term for the organization that decides why and how personal data is processed. It carries the main legal responsibility
Data processor A GDPR term for an organization that processes personal data on the controller's behalf, like an AI vendor running inference on your data
Data subject The person the data is about

The owner is accountable and the custodian implements; exam questions like to test that difference. The controller and processor line matters for AI vendors too. A vendor that uses your data for its own purposes, such as training its own models, may become a controller for that processing, which is one more reason contracts spell out what the vendor may do with your data.

Sovereignty and cross-border residency

Three terms get used interchangeably and shouldn't be:

AI makes residency harder to pin down. Inference may run in a different region from where data is stored, some providers route requests to whichever region has capacity, and fine-tuning, logs and caches all create new copies in new places. Under GDPR, personal data can leave the European Economic Area only with a recognized safeguard, such as an adequacy decision for the destination country, standard contractual clauses (SCCs) or binding corporate rules.

Classification, tagging and sensitive data impact assessments

Data classification assigns each dataset a sensitivity level, like public, internal, confidential or restricted. Tagging attaches that label as metadata, so tools can act on it automatically; a training pipeline can refuse restricted data, and a DLP tool can block it from leaving.

Two AI-specific rules are worth remembering. First, derived artifacts such as embeddings, fine-tuned models and outputs should inherit the highest classification of the data that went into them, unless someone analyzes them and decides otherwise. Second, aggregation can raise sensitivity; individually harmless records combined in one training set can reveal something none of them reveals alone.

A sensitive data impact assessment happens before sensitive data enters an AI pipeline. It asks what sensitive data is included, why it's needed, what happens if the model memorizes or exposes it, and which controls apply. It works like a DPIA, scoped to the data.

Provenance, lineage and sourcing

Provenance is where data came from: who created or collected it, when, and under what terms. Lineage is the path it took afterward through systems and transformations, all the way to the models it trained. Together they let you answer the question every incident eventually asks, which is how bad data got into the model and what else it touched. The CISA guidance recommends tracking provenance in a cryptographically signed, append-only record, so the history itself can't be altered.

Data also comes from two kinds of sources. Real data is collected from actual people and events. Synthetic data is generated by an algorithm or model to mimic the statistical patterns of real data. Synthetic data reduces privacy exposure and can fill gaps, but it can miss rare cases, carry the biases of whatever generated it, and leak real records if the generator memorized them. Label synthetic data as synthetic in your lineage records, so nobody mistakes it for the real thing later.

Chain of custody

Chain of custody is a documented, unbroken record of who handled data, when and what they did with it, from collection through deletion. The idea comes from forensics, where evidence is worthless if you can't show nobody tampered with it. For AI data the controls are hashes at each handoff, digital signatures, access logs, write-once storage and signed transfer records. When you suspect a dataset was poisoned, chain of custody is how you find where it happened.

The AI data lifecycle

Every stage of the data lifecycle needs its own control
AI data lifecycle: six stages and a control for each

Each stage carries its own risk. Collection is where unlawful or untrustworthy data gets in, validation is your best chance to catch bad labels and poisoned samples, and transformation is where lineage most often breaks. Retention and archiving bring the usual minimization and access questions, and deletion has to reach every copy, including the derived ones.

3.2 Data privacy and compliance controls

Privacy by design

Privacy by design means building privacy into a system from the start instead of bolting it on after launch. GDPR turns the idea into law as data protection by design and by default, which also requires default settings to be the most privacy-protective option. The outline names four principles:

In an AI pipeline, those principles look like stripping identifiers before training, a privacy review gate before any new dataset enters the pipeline, customer-data training turned off by default, and prompt logs that don't outlive their purpose. Ask whether the model needs names at all. Usually it doesn't.

Data protection techniques

Technique How it works Reversible? Typical use
Tokenization Swaps a sensitive value for a random token and keeps the mapping in a secured vault Yes, through the vault Card numbers and IDs moving through pipelines; shrinks PCI scope
Masking Hides part or all of a value. Static masking changes stored copies permanently; dynamic masking hides values at display time Static no; dynamic yes, for authorized users Test data, showing only the last four digits
Pseudonymization Replaces identifiers with consistent stand-ins that can be re-linked using separately held information Yes, with that information Analysis that must link records; still personal data under GDPR
Anonymization Removes any reasonable way to identify a person, permanently No Data that falls outside GDPR, if truly anonymous
Noise injection Adds random variation to values or results No Blurring exact figures
Differential privacy Adds calibrated noise so a result barely changes whether or not any one person's data is included No Statistics and model training

Differential privacy is the only one of these with a mathematical guarantee. Its strength is set by a privacy budget, written as epsilon (ε): a smaller epsilon means stronger privacy and less accuracy.

True anonymization is harder than it looks. Researcher Latanya Sweeney showed that ZIP code, birth date and sex alone uniquely identify about 87% of Americans, and researchers re-identified people in Netflix's "anonymized" movie ratings by matching them against public IMDb reviews. When a question offers "remove the names" as anonymization, be suspicious.

Global privacy regulations

Regulation Who it covers What matters for AI
GDPR Anyone processing personal data of people in the EU, wherever the organization is based A lawful basis for training and use, DPIAs, limits on solely automated decisions, the right to erasure. Fines reach €20 million or 4% of global annual turnover, whichever is higher
HIPAA US healthcare providers, health plans and clearinghouses, plus their business associates PHI needs a BAA before it goes to an AI vendor. De-identification follows either Safe Harbor (remove 18 listed identifiers) or Expert Determination. The minimum necessary standard limits what you share
PCI DSS Anyone who stores, processes or transmits payment card data. It's an industry standard that the card brands enforce through contracts Any system that touches card numbers enters PCI scope, so keep them out of prompts, logs and training data. Tokenize instead

State laws such as California's CCPA add their own rules, but the three above are the ones the outline names.

AI-specific privacy challenges

3.3 Securing training data and datasets

Training data integrity

Data integrity means data is complete, accurate and unchanged except by authorized processes. For training data, an integrity failure turns into the model's behavior. The CISA guidance recommends a few layers of protection:

Poisoning, backdoors and extraction

Data poisoning is an attack where someone inserts or alters training samples to change how the model behaves. It comes in a few forms:

A backdoor is poisoning with a hidden trigger. The model behaves normally until an input contains the trigger, like a specific pixel pattern or phrase, and then does what the attacker wants. Because it behaves normally otherwise, a backdoored model passes ordinary testing.

Poisoning at scale turned out to be cheap. Researchers showed in 2023 that many web-scale datasets list URLs instead of storing content, so an attacker can buy an expired domain the dataset points to and swap in poisoned content; they called this split-view poisoning, and estimated they could have poisoned 0.01% of one well-known image dataset for about $60. A 2025 study by the UK AI Security Institute and Anthropic found that around 250 malicious documents were enough to plant a backdoor in language models of every size they tested, so a bigger model and a bigger dataset didn't dilute the attack.

Extraction threats run the other way: instead of putting bad data in, the attacker gets training data out, either by querying the model until it repeats what it memorized (covered in 3.2) or by stealing the curated dataset from storage.

Defenses stack up across the pipeline. Use trusted sources with recorded provenance, verify content hashes when downloading URL-based datasets, deduplicate, run statistical outlier detection, test models for unexpected trigger behavior, and limit who can write to training data at all.

Label modification and malicious datasets

Label flipping changes the labels on training samples, say marking spam as legitimate, so the model learns the wrong lesson. The threat often comes from insiders or crowdsourced labelers. Controls include access control and audit trails on the labeling platform, separation of duties, several annotators per sample with agreement checks, and spot checks against a trusted gold-standard set.

Malicious datasets are published datasets that carry poisoned samples or even executable code. Some file formats and dataset loading scripts run code when you open them, so downloading a dataset can mean running a stranger's program. Scan datasets before use, load them in a sandbox, prefer formats that hold only data, and pin each dependency to a specific verified version.

Dataset tampering and versioning

Version datasets the way you version code. Tools like DVC and lakeFS keep each version immutable and identified by its hash, and every trained model should record the exact dataset version it learned from. That gives you four things: you can detect tampering when a hash doesn't match, reproduce any training run, roll back to a known-good version after finding poison, and list every model that trained on a bad version.

Recursive training and synthetic data trustworthiness

Recursive training happens when models learn from data that earlier models produced, including AI-generated content scraped from the web. A 2024 study in Nature showed that repeating this over generations causes model collapse: models gradually lose the rare cases at the edges of the data and drift toward bland, distorted output. Errors and poisoning compound too, since a flawed generator passes its flaws to every model trained on its output.

To trust synthetic data, validate it against a held-back set of real data, label every synthetic record in your lineage, keep real data in the training mix as an anchor, check the generator for memorized personal data and for bias, and record the generator's version as part of the data's provenance.

3.4 Cryptographic and data protection solutions

Data Security Posture Management

Data Security Posture Management (DSPM) tools scan cloud storage, databases and SaaS applications to find data, classify it, map who can reach it and flag risky exposure, like a public storage bucket, an over-permissioned account or customer data sitting somewhere it shouldn't. For AI, DSPM is how you find the training set someone copied into a personal bucket, the vector store full of HR documents, and the forgotten export a data scientist made six months ago. It answers two questions: where is our sensitive data, and who can get to it? Don't confuse it with CSPM, which checks the configuration of cloud infrastructure instead of the data inside it.

DLP and semantic filtering

Data Loss Prevention (DLP) detects and blocks sensitive data leaving through endpoints, email, the network or cloud apps. Classic DLP matches patterns, like the shape of a card number or Social Security number, or fingerprints of specific documents. For AI, DLP watches both directions: prompts going out to AI services, and responses coming back from models.

Patterns miss a lot with AI, because a model can paraphrase. A summary of a confidential acquisition plan contains no card numbers. Semantic filtering uses language models or classifiers to judge what text means instead of what it looks like, so it can catch a paraphrased secret on the way in or block a model from revealing restricted content on the way out. Semantic filters are models themselves, so they make mistakes and can be fooled; use them as one layer among several.

Encryption for each data state

State What it covers How it's protected
At rest Stored data: disks, databases, object storage, backups, vector stores and model weights AES-256 encryption at the disk, database or field level
In transit Data moving across networks, including between the app, the vector store and the model server TLS 1.2 or later, and mutual TLS between services
In use Data in memory while it's being processed Confidential computing in TEEs (see Domain 2); homomorphic encryption and secure multiparty computation compute on protected data, at a large performance cost

The CISA guidance recommends AES-256 and planning now for post-quantum cryptography, since NIST published its first post-quantum encryption standards in August 2024. Training data and model weights can stay valuable for years, which makes them a target for attackers who steal encrypted data today and wait for the means to decrypt it later.

Key management lifecycle

Encryption is only as good as the handling of its keys. Keys go through a lifecycle of generation, distribution, storage, use, rotation, revocation and destruction, and each stage needs controls.

Keep key administration separate from data administration, so no single person can both reach the data and control its keys.

Purpose-based and restricted data access

Role-based access control (RBAC) grants access by job role, and attribute-based access control (ABAC) decides using attributes of the user, the data and the situation. Purpose-based access control adds a declared purpose: data released for training the fraud model can be used for that and nothing else, which puts purpose limitation into the access system.

AI agents raise the stakes. An agent acting for a user should get that user's permissions narrowed to the task, never a broad service account. An agentic AI data catalog is a governed inventory listing which datasets agents may use, along with each dataset's owner, classification, allowed purposes and access policy, so an agent finds and requests data through policy.

The same rule applies to RAG. The retriever must enforce document permissions at query time and return only content the person asking is allowed to see. Otherwise the AI assistant becomes a way around every access control in the organization.

Media sanitization on high-density AI storage

NIST SP 800-88 defines three levels of sanitization:

AI infrastructure runs on dense SSD and NVMe storage, and overwriting is unreliable there. SSDs spread writes across spare blocks the operating system can't address, so an overwrite can leave old data behind. Cryptographic erase works well on self-encrypting drives: destroying the drive's encryption key makes everything on it unreadable in seconds, provided you trust the drive's encryption. Micro-shredding cuts media into very small particles, because a single flash chip holds so much data that a fragment from an ordinary shredder can still contain an intact chip. Whatever the method, verify it and keep a certificate of sanitization. For data held by a cloud provider, encrypting with keys you control and destroying those keys is often the only sanitization you can perform yourself.

3.5 Model lifecycle and security governance

Model governance

Model governance applies the use-case governance from Domain 2 to the models themselves. Every model needs an owner who is accountable for it, a risk classification that decides how much control it gets, and an approval workflow that says who must sign off before the model reaches production, gets retrained or changes in a material way. Higher tiers need more approvers, and the people who built a model shouldn't be the only ones approving it.

Model documentation and approved registries

A model card is a short document that travels with a model. It records the intended uses and the uses it isn't suited for, a summary of the training data, evaluation results (including results broken out by group), known limitations, ethical considerations, the version and the owner. Google researchers proposed the format in 2019, and it's now standard practice.

An approved model registry is the central catalog of models and versions cleared for use, each with its metadata: lineage, training dataset version, evaluation results, approval record, hash and signature, and deployment status. The rule that makes a registry useful is simple: production systems load models only from the registry. That covers third-party and open models too, which go through the same review before they're registered.

Securing the deployment pipeline

Every model reaches production through the registry
Secure model pipeline: six stages with a rollback path

The pipeline that carries a model from training to production is itself a target, since whoever controls it controls what reaches production. The outline names four stages to secure:

Input and output sanitization, updates and rollback

Input sanitization checks inputs for type, length and format and filters known attack patterns. For language models it can't be complete, because instructions hidden in natural language are hard to separate from legitimate text, and prompt injection has no full fix. That makes output handling just as important.

Output sanitization treats model output as untrusted input to whatever comes next. Encode it before displaying it on a web page so it can't run script, use parameterized queries before it touches a database, validate it before it triggers a command or tool call, and filter personal data and secrets out of it.

Updates go through the same pipeline and approvals as the original model. Roll them out in stages: a canary release sends a small share of traffic to the new version first, and a shadow deployment runs the new model alongside the old one and compares outputs without using the new ones.

Rollback means keeping the previous approved version ready, deciding in advance what triggers a rollback and who can pull it, and testing the procedure before you need it. Remember that a model's behavior also depends on its system prompt, its configuration and its RAG index, so those need versions and rollback paths as well.

Security lifecycle monitoring

Monitoring results feed the reassessment triggers from Domain 2.

Privacy-preserving audit trails

You need records of AI data events, like who accessed which dataset, what prompts went in and what decisions came out, to investigate incidents and prove accountability. Those records are sensitive data themselves, though, since prompts often contain personal or confidential information. A privacy-preserving audit trail keeps enough to investigate without becoming a new data store to protect:

3.6 Model confidentiality, integrity and availability

The CIA triad you already know applies to the model as an asset in its own right.

Model confidentiality

A trained model's weights, the billions of numbers it learned, are the model. They're expensive to produce, and stolen weights let an attacker use the model for free, study it to design better attacks, or strip out its safety training. The architecture, training recipe, system prompts and fine-tuning data are intellectual property too.

Protect weights the way you'd protect your most sensitive data: encrypt them at rest, restrict and log every access, keep the number of copies small, apply insider-threat controls, and watch for large outbound transfers. A 2024 RAND report on securing model weights mapped dozens of distinct ways weights can be stolen and defined five security levels, from defending against opportunistic attackers up to defending against well-resourced nation states. The more capable and valuable the model, the higher the level it needs.

Model extraction prevention

Model extraction, also called model stealing, happens when an attacker sends a model many queries and uses the input and output pairs to train a copy that behaves the same way. The attacker never touches your servers; they use your API exactly as designed, just at volume and with a purpose. Defenses include:

Model watermarking and fingerprinting

These two sound alike and work differently:

A watermark is added on purpose, and a fingerprint is measured from what's already there. Neither is foolproof; fine-tuning a stolen model or distilling it into a new one can weaken both.

Model integrity

File format matters too. Some common model formats, including Python's pickle, can run arbitrary code when a model is loaded, so loading an untrusted model can compromise the server. Formats like safetensors store only the numbers.

Model availability

AI services are expensive to run, which gives attackers two ways to hurt you: take the service down, or run up the bill.

Relying on one model provider is an availability risk too, so critical services may need a second provider ready to take over.

3.7 AI data and model supply chain risk

Domain 2 covered the contract side of AI suppliers. This section covers the technical side: how to judge the datasets and models you didn't build before you trust them.

Assessing third-party, open and public datasets

Before a dataset from outside the organization goes near a model, a supply chain risk assessment should answer these questions:

That last question isn't hypothetical. A 2024 audit of popular AI datasets found that most listings on major hosting sites were missing license information, and many of the licenses that were listed were wrong. A team that trusted those labels could have trained a commercial model on data it had no right to use. Scale the depth of the assessment to the use; a dataset for an internal experiment needs less scrutiny than one training a customer-facing model.

Verifying provenance and authenticity

Provenance tells you where something claims to come from; authenticity verification proves the claim. For models and data from vendors and public hubs:

Pinning matters because names can be hijacked. Security researchers have shown that when a publisher's account on a model hub is deleted, an attacker can register the same name, so code that pulls a model by name downloads the attacker's version instead, and nobody notices. Typosquatting, publishing under a name one character off from a popular one, works the same way it does for software packages.

Risks of foundation and pre-trained models

A foundation model is a large model trained on broad data that other applications build on, and a pre-trained model is any model you start from instead of training from scratch. Building on one is sensible, and it means inheriting risks you can't fully see:

Risk What it looks like Controls
Unknown training data Copyrighted, personal or poisoned data you can't inspect Vendor documentation, contract terms, your own testing
Hidden backdoors Research in 2024 showed planted backdoor behavior can survive standard safety training Source only from trusted publishers, red team before registering
Shared weaknesses A jailbreak that works on the base model works on every product built on it Your own guardrails, and monitoring advisories for the model
Malicious model files Formats that run code when loaded Scan files, load in a sandbox, prefer safe formats
Weakened safety after fine-tuning Research has shown that fine-tuning, even on harmless data, can erode a model's safety behavior Re-run safety and red team tests after every fine-tune
Inherited bias and hallucination The base model's flaws show up in your outputs Bias and accuracy testing in your own context
License limits Acceptable use policies or commercial restrictions Legal review at intake
Vendor dependency Deprecations, silent updates, outages Version pinning, notice terms, a fallback model

All of this comes together at registry intake. A third-party model gets scanned, tested, red teamed, documented and approved before it's registered, the same as one you built.

Practice questions

As with Domain 2, these are my own questions in the ISC2 style. Pick the BEST answer, and when two look right, put the safety of people first, then legal obligations, then the mission.

  1. A data science team wants to train a customer-facing model on a popular open dataset from a public repository. What should happen FIRST?
    • A. Assess the dataset's provenance, license and contents
    • B. Begin training and monitor the model for anomalies
    • C. Encrypt the dataset at rest
    • D. Convert the dataset into synthetic data
  2. An organization learns that an unauthorized party altered a training dataset before the current production model was trained. The model supports clinical decisions. What should be done FIRST?
    • A. Add output filters to catch incorrect recommendations
    • B. Notify the team that supplied the dataset
    • C. Stop or restrict the model's use in patient care
    • D. Add more data to the current dataset and retrain
  3. Which technique gives a mathematical guarantee that limits what anyone can learn about an individual from a model's outputs?
    • A. Tokenization
    • B. Masking
    • C. Pseudonymization
    • D. Differential privacy
  4. An organization is returning leased SSD storage arrays that held AI training data, including regulated personal information. Which sanitization method is MOST appropriate?
    • A. Degauss every drive
    • B. Perform a verified, documented cryptographic erase of the self-encrypting drives
    • C. Delete the files and reformat the drives
    • D. Overwrite each drive with random data three times
  5. An employee receives an answer from the company's RAG-based assistant that includes details from a confidential executive memo they aren't authorized to read. What is the MOST likely root cause?
    • A. The model hallucinated the details
    • B. The retriever doesn't enforce document permissions for the person asking
    • C. The memo wasn't encrypted at rest
    • D. The model wasn't fine-tuned on company policy
  6. An attacker sends a high volume of queries that systematically sweep across the range of possible inputs to a public prediction API, which returns full confidence scores. What is the attacker MOST likely attempting?
    • A. Model extraction
    • B. Data poisoning
    • C. Denial of wallet
    • D. Prompt injection
  7. Which control BEST ensures that only approved models run in production?
    • A. A model card for every model
    • B. Continuous drift monitoring
    • C. Loading only signed models from the approved registry, with signatures verified at load time
    • D. Rate limiting on the serving endpoint
  8. A development team puts the API key for a commercial model service in an agent's system prompt so the agent can call the service. What is the BEST recommendation?
    • A. Encrypt the system prompt
    • B. Rotate the key every month
    • C. Instruct the model never to reveal the key
    • D. Move the key to a secrets vault and have the application retrieve short-lived credentials at runtime
  9. A hospital wants to share patient data with a research partner to train a model. The partner has no need to identify anyone. Which approach BEST reduces privacy risk?
    • A. Pseudonymize identifiers and keep the re-linking key in-house
    • B. De-identify the data using an accepted HIPAA method, limit it to needed fields, and prohibit re-identification by contract
    • C. Encrypt the data in transit to the partner
    • D. Remove names and send everything else
  10. A generative AI service that supports patient intake triage at a hospital becomes overloaded at peak times. Which design is MOST appropriate?
    • A. Queue requests until capacity returns, however long that takes
    • B. Disable rate limits so the service can accept more requests
    • C. Fall back to a staffed triage process with clear escalation
    • D. Assign every patient the most common triage category until the service recovers
  11. Who should decide whether a dataset of customer records may be used to train a new model?
    • A. The information owner
    • B. The data custodian
    • C. The data scientist leading the project
    • D. The cloud provider hosting the data
  12. A team loads a pre-trained model from a public hub by its name. The publisher's account is later deleted, and someone else registers the same name and uploads a different model. Which control would BEST have prevented the team from loading the new model?
    • A. Fine-tuning the model on internal data
    • B. Rate limiting downloads from the hub
    • C. Encrypting the model at rest
    • D. Pinning the model to a verified hash or signed version from the original publisher
Show the answer key
  1. A. Provenance, license and content checks come before anything touches the data. Monitoring after training (B) finds problems too late, and encryption (C) protects confidentiality and does nothing for trustworthiness.
  2. C. Patient safety comes first, so the immediate step is to stop or restrict the model in care. After that, roll back to a known-good dataset version and retrain. Output filters (A) leave the poison inside the model, and retraining on the tampered data (D) keeps it.
  3. D. Differential privacy is the only option with a provable bound. Pseudonymized data can be re-linked, and masking and tokenization protect specific values without limiting what a model learns.
  4. B. The drives are leaving your control and must be reusable, and overwriting is unreliable on SSDs. Degaussing (A) doesn't work on flash storage, and reformatting (C) leaves data recoverable.
  5. B. The assistant returned content the person couldn't open directly, which means retrieval ignored their permissions. That's an access control failure.
  6. A. Systematic, high-volume queries plus full confidence scores is the classic setup for training a copy. Defenses are rate limits, monitoring and returning less information.
  7. C. Signing plus a registry that production must load from is what enforces approval. Model cards (A) document, and they don't block anything.
  8. D. Secrets don't belong in prompts, because prompts leak. Telling the model to keep a secret (C) isn't a control, and rotation (B) only shortens how long a leaked key works.
  9. B. The partner doesn't need identities, so de-identify and minimize; contract terms cover what technology can't. Pseudonymized data (A) is still personal data, and removing names alone (D) leaves people re-identifiable.
  10. C. People's health is involved, so the fallback must be safe and staffed. A shared default category (D) is dangerous, and indefinite queuing (A) delays care.
  11. A. The information owner decides how a dataset may be used. The custodian implements controls, and the project lead is a requester.
  12. D. Pinning to a verified hash or signature means a swapped model won't match. The other options don't verify where the model came from.

Sources